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Abstract
The objective of the paper is to draw attention to the possible relevance of the categories of cogni-
tive linguistics for the structural analysis of ritual. Taking the Iyengar Yoga āsana practice as an 
example, the author proposes to treat it as a quasi-linguistic phenomenon and analyses the sym-
bolic structure of its elements (single āsanāni). The tools applied in this pursuit are the basic catego-
ries of Langacker’s cognitive grammar. By pointing to the key tenets of cognitive linguistics, in-
cluding the claim concerning the symbolic (and, thus, semantic) nature of grammar, the author 
attempts to rephrase Staal’s thesis concerning the meaninglessness of ritual to accommodate it to 
the cognitive (or, more precisely, enactive) paradigm. She suggests a possible relationship between 
the schematic symbolic nature of ritual and the specific symbolic nature of doctrine. After some of 
the most salient linguistic phenomena within Iyengar Yoga āsana practice are described, their co-
herence with certain doctrinal interpretations is briefly discussed.
Słowa kluczowe: Iyengar, nowoczesna joga posturalna, asana, enaktywizm, gramatyka kognityw-
na, rytuał 
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The objective of the present paper is to indicate the possible relevance of the catego-
ries of cognitive linguistics for the structural analysis of ritual. The analysed ritual 
is the āsana practice in so-called Iyengar Yoga. The main thesis, proven through 
the application of the categories of Ronald Langacker’s cognitive grammar, is that 
this practice is a structured phenomenon, and that its structure corresponds to the 
structure of language. Treating yogic postures and their sequences as quasi-linguistic, 
symbolic phenomena opens up perspectives for the study of the relationship between 
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ritual structure and doctrinal interpretations. Finding coherence between the sche-
matic semantic structures underlying Iyengar Yoga āsana practice and the specific 
semantic structures of Iyengar’s exposition of the categories of Sāṃkhya-Yoga may 
point to the significance of the embodied experience acquired during practice for the 
understanding of some of the most basic Indian religio-philosophical notions.
The main tenets of cognitive linguistics
Cognitive linguistics has garnered attention in recent years as a useful analytical de-
vice within the study of religions.1 However, it seems that the main focus so far has 
been the cognitive theory of conceptual metaphor, as proposed by George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson.2 Apparently, the ingenuity and universal applicability of this theory 
has rendered it so popular that some outside observers come to equate it with cogni-
tive linguistics in general. It must be stressed, however, that the cognitive theory of 
tropes is not the very core of cognitive linguistics, but rather a necessary implication 
of its most basic tenets.
At the core of the cognitive approach to language is the observation that all lin-
guistic meaning is built upon the embodied experience. As all cognitive structures 
are derived from recurrent sensorimotor patterns,3 also linguistic structures are con-
structed and interpreted based on these patterns. The most rudimentary experience of 
the body – its orientation in and movement through space, its perceptive activity and 
interaction with the environment – provides the basis for language. Linguistic expres-
sions are assembled from and interpreted through embodied schematic models. Mark 
Johnson calls the schematic units of embodied meaning image schemata.4 They are 
recurrent structures of perceptive and motor programmes abstracted from everyday 
experience, in the form of general templates. They are complex, i.e. made up of parts 
and relations. They are also malleable, so they may be modified and filled with any 
amount of detail to create an infinite number of what Johnson calls “rich images”. For 
example, a schema of an object moving into a container may be applied to interpret 
and model an expression such as “John entered the room”, but also “an infection en-
tered the wound” or “the two countries entered into an agreement”.
The other important assumption of the cognitive approach towards language is 
that grammar is semantic. According to Langacker, all grammatical categories – start-
ing with such basics as a noun or a verb and ending with composite structures – are 
grounded in the embodied experience, based on the embodied schemata, and thus 
1 See e.g. J. Jurewicz, Kosmogonia Rygwedy. Myśl i metafora, Warszawa 2001; E. Slingerland, Ef-
fortless Action. Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China, Oxford 2003.
2 G. Lakoff, M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 1980.
3 This is the main claim of an approach referred to by Varela et al. as “enactive”. See F.J. Varela, 
E.T. Thompson, E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience, Cambridge 
1993, p. 172 ff.
4 M. Johnson, The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, Chi-
cago 1987, pp. 18–40.
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meaningful.5 For the present discussion, the schematic background of some rudimen-
tary grammatical phenomena is of importance.6 A noun, for instance, is schematically 
represented by what Langacker refers to as a “thing”. Prototypically it is a material 
object, but generally it is any product of the mental capacity of grouping and reifi-
cation. By virtue of this capacity, a notion as abstract as “yoga” can be construed 
as a “thing”, being a delimited set of practices based on a delimited set of religio-
philosophical assumptions and represented as a group of entities bound together on 
the basis of their historical, cultural and phenomenological tangency. The schema for 
a verb, on the other hand, is a “process”, i.e. a set of relations between “things” rep-
resented sequentially within the temporal domain. Prototypically it is a non-material 
interaction associated with transfer of energy. A distinction needs to be made between 
perfective verbs, for which the construed relation is heterogenous (thus changing 
through time) and imperfectives, for which this relation remains unaltered (is ho-
mogenous). A participle, though a derivative of the verb, differs significantly in its 
schematic representation. Though a process, it is reified and construed in a summary 
fashion within a bounded temporal scope. Finally, a preposition is also represented 
summarily as a heterogenous (into, upwards) or homogenous (in, up) relation. It is, 
however, construed independently of the temporal domain.
Frits Staal, language and ritual
One of the scholars who postulated similarity between the structure of language and 
that of ritual was Frits Staal. In his analysis of the Vedic ritual of Agnicayana, Staal 
applied the categories of Noam Chomsky’s generative grammar.7 He proposed un-
derstanding ritual as a hierarchical rather than linear structure, in which in a more 
complex unit smaller ritual structures are embedded, consisting of even smaller sin-
gular rites. He claimed that the alterations of smaller units within larger systems can 
be described with reference to Chomsky’s transformational rules. 
Staal’s most significant thesis is that ritual is essentially asemantic.8 Being a form 
of orthopraxy rather than an expression of orthodoxy, it is devoid of any original 
external semantic references. Just like music, it is pure structure, pure syntax.9 Thus, 
it cannot convey meaning directly, and any doctrinal references to it are made ex 
post facto in an arbitrary manner. If the author of the present paper represents this 
claim correctly, according to Staal the meaningful doctrine and the meaningless ritual 
constitute two originally independent domains, connected in a vague manner only 
through post hoc rationalisation.
5 R. Langacker, Cognitive Grammar. A Basic Introduction, Oxford 2008, p. 4.
6 Ibidem, pp. 112 ff.
7 F. Staal, Rituals and Mantras. Rules without Meaning, Delhi 1996, pp. 52–60, 85–114.
8 Ibidem, pp. 131–140.
9 Ibidem, pp. 165–190.
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The foregoing thesis is in line with the assumption that syntax precedes seman-
tics.10 This assumption, however, is not upheld by the proponents of cognitive gram-
mar, who postulate that (embodied) meaning precedes syntax, rendering it meaning-
ful. Thus, if the categories of cognitive grammar are to be applied to the analysis of 
ritual, Staal’s thesis needs to be rephrased. In fact, it seems that what Staal refers to 
as “meaningless” may be considered entirely “meaningful” from the standpoint of 
cognitive grammar. If a discrepancy between the standpoints of Staal and Langacker 
arises, it is mainly due to the differences in the definitions of the term.
By saying that ritual is meaningless, Staal claims that it is self-contained and does 
not bear any direct correspondence to doctrinal notions. He does, however, coin the 
term “structural meaning”, referring to the internal syntactic relations between the el-
ements of ritual.11 It seems that this term is relatively close to the concept of meaning 
adapted by Langacker. According to the latter, being semantic means being repre-
sented conceptually in relation to embodied schemata. Thus a conceptual structure 
grounded in the embodied experience is a meaningful one. It seems obvious that all 
ritual actions, in order to be performed, need to be represented conceptually. Thus, 
from the standpoint of cognitive grammar, they need to be considered meaningful.
It seems that the difference between ritual and doctrine is not so much the dif-
ference between meaninglessness and meaningfulness as that between schematicity 
and specificity of meaning. According to Langacker, in language there exists no clear 
distinction between grammar and lexicon.12 Pure grammar and pure lexicon are rather 
two poles of a continuum, with schematic representations situated at the grammatical 
and specific representations at the lexical pole. The study of yoga rituals may lead 
one to suppose that the interpretative activity taking place within religious traditions 
might also form a continuum, with a “pure ritual” pole at one end and a “pure doc-
trine” pole at the other. The meaning situated at the ritual pole would be entirely 
schematic, limited to the raw embodied schemata abstracted from ritual actions. The 
meaning at the doctrinal pole would be specific, based on rich images, mostly of 
a metaphorical character. However, just as many composite linguistic expressions 
are situated between pure lexicon and pure grammar,13 most religious representations 
probably arise somewhere between the purely schematic conceptualisations of ritual 
actions and the rich, metaphorical doctrinal notions. This means, on the one hand, 
that the schemata abstracted from the embodied experience acquired during ritual 
may enforce better grasping of doctrinal representations by providing their schematic 
basis, and, on the other hand, that doctrinal notions may render the embodied ritual 
experience more salient. Such dialectic presupposes mutual coherence between the 
schematic meaning of ritual and the specific meaning of doctrine. Whether such co-
herence exists between the performance of Agnicayana and the “ad hoc”, “arbitrary” 
meanings ascribed to it requires a careful study. So far it has been confirmed that 
coherence can be traced between the schematic structure of Iyengar Yoga āsana prac-
10 Ibidem, p. 112.
11 Ibidem, p. 174 ff.
12 R. Langacker, op.cit., p. 22.
13 Ibidem, p. 18 ff.
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tice and the metaphorical interpretation of the categories of Pātañjala Yoga cultivated 
within the Iyengar tradition. This coherence shall be touched upon on the following 
pages.
The Iyengar Yoga āsana practice
The studied phenomenon, Iyengar Yoga (IY), constitutes part of a global, originally 
Anglophone movement referred to by Elizabeth de Michelis as Modern Postural Yo-
ga.14 This movement was initiated at the beginning of the 20th century, its main focus 
the practice of sequences of yogic postures (āsana) and breath-control techniques 
(prāṇāyāma). It developed under the influence of the European physical culture 
movement, imported to colonial India at the beginning of the 20th century.15 Its loose 
doctrinal references, though grounded in Sāṃkhya-Yoga Darśana, are strongly influ-
enced by Neo-Vedanta and Swami Vivekananda’s interpretation of yoga.16
The founder of IY was B.K.S. Iyengar (1918–2014), a vishnuite brahmin born in 
Karnataka, initially a student of the yogi Tirumalai Krishnamacharya in Mysore. He 
spent most of his life teaching in Pune, Maharashtra, where in 1975 he founded the 
Ramamani Iyengar Memorial Yoga Institute (RIMYI). In the 1950s he started teach-
ing yoga abroad. He published several influential books, including a translation of the 
Yoga Sūtra with his own commentaries.17
Nowadays, the global IY community brings together thousands of enthusiasts 
worldwide. It has a loose structure, and the involvement of most practitioners does 
not go much further than attending group practice a few times a week. However, 
a comprehensive training programme for (numerous) teachers has functioned for 
decades, involving arduous, life-long practice under the supervision of elder teach-
ers, regular visits to the RIMYI and a centrally regulated system of examinations. The 
more experienced teachers are expected to be familiar not only with the method of 
āsana and prāṇāyāma practice, but also with elements of Indian religio-philosophical 
systems.
A few features of the IY āsana practice are of particular significance. The first 
involves treating āsana not as an indivisible whole, but as a syntagm. Each posture is 
understood as a composite system comprising smaller units, i.e. precisely described 
configurations of minute body parts. These may include relations between different 
body parts (e.g. “the skin from the outer sides of the neck [moving] into the cervi-
cal vertebra”18), between the body part and the body in a broad sense (e.g. moving 
the “top outer thigh into the body”19) or between the body part and its surroundings 
14 E. de Michelis, Modern Yoga and the Western Esoteric Tradition, London 2004, p. 187 ff.
15 M. Singleton, Yoga Body. The Origin of Modern Posture Practice, Oxford 2010, p. 81 ff.
16 E. de Michelis, op.cit., p. 208 ff.
17 B.K.S. Iyengar, Light on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, New Delhi 2005 (first edition: 1993).
18 From the transcript of a class taught by Lois Steinberg, an advanced IY teacher, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=4kvOB18HPr4 [accessed: 14.11.2014].
19 From the transcript of a class taught by Geeta Iyengar, an advanced IY teacher and B.K.S. Iyen-
gar’s daughter, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyK7zmrRcwo [accessed: 14.11.2014].
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(e.g. “thighs back and up”).20 For the sake of brevity and clarity, from now on these 
configurations shall be referred to as somemes. The same somemes are repeated in 
different postures in different configurations, which makes them slightly resemble 
phonemes. However, unlike phonemes as understood by structuralists, somemes are 
not asemantic (being direct applications of embodied schemata) and do not form 
distinctive oppositions. 
Secondly, different āsanāni can be grouped in paradigmatic sets and can be com-
bined into larger syntagms. The former are groups of postures with similar someme 
configurations (e.g. standing postures, backbends, turns, forward bends, inversions 
etc.). The latter are structured sequences of postures, arranged according to a vast 
set of rules. It must be noted that no limited set of sequences exists. As the rules of 
arranging the postures are general and concern relations either between somemes or 
between entire paradigmatic sets of postures rather than relations between particular 
āsanāni, the number of possible correct āsana configurations is practically infinite.
Finally, the āsana practice is interpreted in the categories of Sāṃkhya-Yoga 
Darśana. Iyengar’s chief claim is that all the eight limbs (aṣṭāṅgāni) of Pātañjala 
Yoga (yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhāraṇā, dhyāna, samādhi) are 
realised within āsana.21 Also other categories of the Yoga Sūtra (e.g. the concept of 
citta) are interpreted and explained with reference to the experience of āsana prac-
tice.
Āsana practice as a ritual
So far the category of “ritual” has been referred to several times. As yet, though, 
there has been no explanation of how exactly it is understood and why IY āsana 
practice should belong to it. Even though the ritual character of Agnicayana might 
be self-explanatory to most scholars, calling what seems to be a secular and purely 
physical22 activity a ritual might raise some eyebrows. For the purpose of the present 
paper the author has adapted a tentative definition of ritual, taking into consideration 
the findings of Staal and the definition of religion as proposed by Scott Atran,23 with 
some amendments. Ritual is thus considered a recurrent, structured, temporally and 
spatially bounded activity of selected members of a community, consisting of formally 
restricted motor and speech acts, bearing reference to a theory of universal human 
existential anxieties such as death, suffering, deception etc. shared by this commu-
nity. This definition seems both broad and narrow enough, and IY āsana practice 
fits within it. It is a recurrent, structured (as the forthcoming paragraphs will show), 
20 From the transcript of a class taught by Carrie Owerko, an intermediate level IY teacher, http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kCFOztW7j1s [accessed: 14.11.2014].
21 B.K.S. Iyengar, Yoga Vṛkṣa, The Tree of Yoga, Oxford 1988, p. 51–76.
22 One might expect Staal, in light of his conviction that ritual activity has no original doctrinal ref-
erence, to have no problem with a ritual being “purely physical”. The enactive paradigm, with its focus 
on the category of embodiment, does not underestimate the symbolic significance of “purely physical” 
actions either.
23 S. Atran, In Gods We Trust. The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Oxford 2002, p. 4.
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temporally and spatially bounded activity. Its practitioners constitute a community 
(though a loosely structured one). The group of community members participating in 
a single practice may range from one to a few hundred. Iyengar’s own interpretation 
of the cosmology and anthropology of the Yoga Sūtra provides the “theory of univer-
sal human existential anxieties” to which the practice refers.
The prototypical form of an IY āsana ritual includes a short seated meditation and 
a chant, mutual performance of a sequence of āsanāni guided by a teacher and passive 
relaxation. Prototypically, each āsana from the sequence is performed by a teacher 
or an assistant facing the group of practitioners, so that the group may mirror their 
actions. Each posture consists of the phase of entering into the pose, maintaining the 
pose and coming out of the pose, all according to a formalised pattern. Each phase 
requires first sequential and then simultaneous execution of multiple somemes. It is 
guided by the teacher’s detailed instructions pertaining to particular somemes. The 
original language of the instructions is English (used in Pune and during international 
workshops and conventions). In schools around the globe local languages are used. 
The form of the instructions is illustrated well by the following passage: “Place the 
hands down. Now lift the elbow up slightly. And then, move the outer elbow liga-
ments in... keep that as you place the elbows down. And then move the outer wrists 
again to the small finger... now place the top of the head down... Lift the shoulders 
up... your bottom ear has to go back, lift the knees up. Now, bent knees, slowly come 
up... Lift the inner edges of the feet up... feet forward, navel back...”.24 It should be 
noted that “maintaining the pose” is not tantamount to passivity. Constant conceptual 
and motor effort is undertaken during this stage, to ensure the proper maintaining of 
all somemes.
The quasi-linguistic structure of Iyengar Yoga āsana practice
According to Langacker, language, as a symbolic structure, is bipolar.25 The semantic 
pole consists of conceptualisations of expressions. These are dynamic processes of 
generating mental representations of these expressions, based on image schemata.26 
Such activity involves mental scanning of a representation through a given domain 
(spatial, temporal, colour space etc.) in an either sequential (i.e. temporal) or summa-
ry (i.e. atemporal) manner. The phonological pole is understood broadly and consists 
of phonetic, graphic or motor representations of conceptualisations.
As a symbolic structure, āsana has the conceptualisation of the posture at its se-
mantic pole. Its phonological pole, on the other hand, has two modes of representa-
tion. One consists of the actually executed posture, while the other encompasses the 
verbal commands pertaining to it. As the two correspond to each other, it is justifi-
24 Excerpts from a transcript of Lois Steinberg teaching sālamba śīrṣāsana, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=4kvOB18HPr4 [accessed: 14.11.2014].
25 R. Langacker, op. cit., p. 15 ff.
26 Langacker divides Johnson’s general notion of “image schemata” into three separate categories: 
minimal concepts, configurational concepts and conceptual archetypes (ibidem, pp. 33–34). For the pur-
poses of the present discussion such detailed division is superfluous.
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able for the forthcoming analysis to sometimes refer to the motor representations 
and sometimes to the verbal ones. The minimal symbolic elements (morphemes in 
Langacker’s sense) are somemes, being units both of articulation (executed motor 
patterns) and of meaning (their conceptualisation).
The preliminary analysis concerned fragments of IY classes held by senior teach-
ers. Transcripts of the teachers’ commands were juxtaposed with the dynamic struc-
ture of actual postures. So far, only single āsanāni have been studied, without a focus 
on larger syntagms. The phonological structures salient in the teachers’ verbal de-
scriptions and in actual postures were described in order to identify the conceptu-
alisations expected at the semantic pole. The analysis was comprehensive, but the 
limited volume of this paper means that only a few of the most interesting phenomena 
may be discussed.
The first observation concerns the modes of conceptual scanning of postures 
through the spatio-temporal domain. It seems that during this process a gradual 
conceptual shift occurs from one, through two and three up to four dimensions (the 
fourth being the temporal one). When a four-dimensional model of the body is repre-
sented, the dimensions are wound back, so that finally the posture is reduced to two 
or even one spatial dimension (the temporal domain being compressed or removed 
altogether). This process is realised through first locating a point on the body (a de-
limited minute body part), then conceptualising (and executing) its linear movement 
(see Fig. 1). Two-dimensional conceptualisations are introduced by superimposing 
two linear movements in different directions and through the introduction of rota-
tional movement. The superimposition of even more linear and rotational movements 
of multiple body parts gradually turns the representation of the body into a three-
dimensional object.27 Simultaneously, the increasingly complex models of the body 
are represented sequentially along the temporal axis. This, however, is not the end 
of the conceptual activity. Once a four-dimensional representation of an āsana is in-
tact, the practitioner is urged to wind the dimensions back by conceptualising distant 
body parts as moving towards a single plane or axis. Inward movement begins to 
dominate and the spinal axis becomes the main reference point. In the given exam-
ple, adho mukha śvanāsana (Fig. 2), the outer arms are moved towards the central 
axis of the body, and the front thighs are rotated towards it. The shoulder blades are 
moved into the body, thus nearing the spine, and so is the navel, receding towards 
the spinal column passively. Thus the entire posture becomes almost reduced to the 
spine. Then the upward and backward movement of the arms, the trunk and the legs 
encourages the practitioner to conceptualise the entire body as nearing a vertical axis 
running through the heels. As a result, what seems to be a complex three-dimensional 
construction is conceptually reduced to a line.
27 An interesting example of this activity is the introduction of spiral motion. In numerous postures 
onto the rotational movement upward movement is superimposed. E.g. in turns the trunk is construed 
as a structure built of horizontal layers that are simultaneously rotated around the spinal axis and lifted. 
The salience of spiral motion is certainly of interest (it plays a major role e.g. in the haṭha yoga notions 
of the nāḍyah and of kuṇḍalinī) and requires more attention.
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Fig. 1. The gradual development of a four-dimensional model of the posture during āsana 
conceptualisation and execution. 
Fig. 2. The subsequent “winding” of spatial dimensions through construing the body parts as 
nearing a single axis.
The winding of the temporal dimension can be traced through the analysis of 
the verbal expressions accompanying the execution of postures. First, expressions 
suggesting simultaneous execution of somemes occur. In sentences like “elongating 
the trunk, bring the... right palm to the right ankle”, “while... moving that [indent] 
into the body, inhale”,28 the present participle delimits a fixed immediate temporal 
scope of the first relation, and it is only within this compressed scope that the second 
relation occurs. Secondly, increased use of imperfective verbs (e.g. be, keep) at the 
end of the transcripts suggests that the relations determined by particular somemes 
turn from temporally heterogenous to homogenous. Though the conceived time may 
still be represented, no change is associated with it. Finally, the omission of verbs in 
favour of prepositions at the end of the transcripts suggests that the somemes are con-
strued atemporally. Expressions such as “pubic bone upward”, “shoulder-blade into 
28 Excerpts from the transcript of a class taught by Geeta Iyengar, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=LyK7zmrRcwo [accessed: 14.11.2014].
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the body”, “head of the femur bone up” point to a shift of the scanning mode from 
sequential to summary, with the temporal dimension excluded altogether.
Another phenomenon concerns replacing possessive pronouns in front of body 
part names with the definite article. It is natural in the English language to use posses-
sives while referring to someone’s body parts (“turn your head”, “lift your arm”).29 
During IY practice, however, expressions such as “don’t lose the outer wrist”, “lift 
the knees up”, “don’t harden the eyebrows” are commonplace. Through this opera-
tion, body parts become abstracted, generalised and thus separated from their owner. 
This seems to be related to their subsequent animisation and personalisation, crucial 
for the interpretation of certain religio-philosophical notions.
The animisation of body parts also seems to be influenced by the constant use of 
the imperative clause. As Langacker notes, simple imperatives in the English lan-
guage possess no overt subject.30 While for fully fledged exercitives (e.g. “I order 
you to lift the sternum”) the primary focus (the trajector, in Langacker’s terms) is 
the speaker-subject, and for plain constatives (e.g. “You lift the sternum”), the trajec-
tor is the subject (though not necessarily the speaker), for imperatives (e.g. “Lift the 
sternum”), due to the absence of the subject, it is the action of lifting itself that be-
comes the trajector. Thus, due to the evolutionarily advantageous human propensity 
to attribute agency wherever there is motion, the object of the action is construed as 
self-propelled, ergo animate.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion hopefully shows that the IY āsana practice is a ritual pos-
sessing an internal structure which can be understood in the categories of Langacker’s 
cognitive grammar. The main question, however, is whether and how this observation 
can be of any value. The answer is that it can, providing means to investigate coher-
ence between the schematic semantic structures of the āsana ritual and the specific 
semantic structures present in the exposition of the doctrine. A preliminary study 
has shown that such coherence exists. The schematic representations underlying the 
linguistic phenomena occurring at the ritual pole correspond to the rich metaphorical 
structures identifiable in Iyengar’s interpretation of the categories of pātañjala yoga. 
To give brief examples related to the phenomena discussed above, the atemporalisa-
tion through the summary mode of scanning, implicit in the use of imperfectives, 
participles and omission of verbs, corresponds to Iyengar’s understanding of dhyāna. 
“[I]n dhyāna”, he writes, “psychological and chronological time come to a stand-
still as the mind observes its own behaviour”.31 The expanding and subsequent wind-
ing of dimensions during āsana conceptualisation may correspond to the construal 
of the transition from dhāraṇā through dhyāna to samādhi. “[D]hāraṇā”, it is said, 
“is single-pointed attention. It modifies into dhyāna by being sustained in time 
whilst dissolving its one-pointed character implicit in the word ‘concentration’. 
29 See R. Langacker, op.cit., p. 184. 
30 Ibidem, p. 470.
31 B.K.S. Iyengar, B.K.S. Iyengar, Light on the Yoga Sutras of Patañjali..., p. 169.
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When it becomes all-pointed, which is also no-pointed... it leads to total absorption 
(samādhi)”.32 Finally, the omnipresence of imperatives and lack of possessives in 
front of body part names, contributing to the animisation and personification of body 
parts, is coherent with the metaphorico-synecdochic model of the body as a person 
made of persons made of persons. This model seems to contribute to understanding 
citta (the phenomenal consciousness of Pātañjala Yoga) and puruṣa (the absolute 
consciousness of Sāṃkhya-Yoga) as minuscule beings immersed in each and every 
cell of the body, i.e. the personifying principles of the cells.
Two concluding remarks will sum up the foregoing discussion. The first concerns 
the scope of the performed analysis – as said before, so far only the structure of sin-
gle āsanāni was investigated. An analysis of entire sequences of postures will surely 
expose many more interesting phenomena. The second has to do with the significance 
of the proposed thesis. The conclusion, drawn in light of the tenets of cognitive lin-
guistics, that ritual activities based on intense motor activity have a structure similar 
to that of language, is not trivial. Just because embodied sensorimotor patterns under-
lie language, this does not mean that all sensorimotor activity needs to be structured 
in the same manner language is. However, identification of such structuring, if it ex-
ists, may open up ways of exploring the embodied, ritual origin of religious meaning.
Literature References
Atran S., In Gods We Trust. The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, Oxford 2002.
Iyengar B.K.S., Yoga Vṛkṣa, The Tree of Yoga, Oxford 1988.
Iyengar B.K.S., Light on the Yoga Sutras of Patañjali, New Delhi 2005.
Johnson M., The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason, Chicago 
1987.
Jurewicz J., Kosmogonia Rygwedy. Myśl i metafora, Warszawa 2001.
Lakoff G., Johnson M., Metaphors We Live By, Chicago 1980.
Langacker R., Cognitive Grammar. A Basic Introduction, Oxford 2008.
de Michelis E., Modern Yoga and the Western Esoteric Tradition, London 2004.
Singleton M., Yoga Body. The Origin of Modern Posture Practice, Oxford 2010.
Slingerland E., Effortless Action. Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early 
China, Oxford 2003.
Staal F., Rituals and Mantras. Rules without Meaning, Delhi 1996.
Varela F.J., Thompson E.T., Rosch E., The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experi-
ence, Cambridge 1993.
32 Ibidem, p. 171.
